Abstract. The authentication technology based on smart card and password is simple and effective, it can be applied to verify the remote user's legal identity and prevent unauthorized users to access resources in insecure network environment. Nowdays, many experts and scholars have put forward authentication schemes based on cryptography. However, the study found that these mechanisms are vulnerable to various malicious attacks and safety needs to be further improved. This paper presents a remote user authentication protocol based on smart card which can deal with many kinds of attacks. At the same time, the security and performance analysis of this scheme have been taken. Compared to other authentication mechanisms, our proposed scheme can withstand many kinds of malicious attacks and it is more suitable for the practical application.
Introduction
In recent years, with the development of Internet and e-commerce technology, people can conveniently do many things at home such as online shopping, online learning, telemedicine, online banking, online transactions, etc. However, a variety of malicious attacks are increasing, network security has become a serious problem. As the first line of defense security system, authentication can verify the identity of users before users access the service in the network environment. Many experts and scholars have put forward authentication schemes based on cryptography. The study found that these mechanisms are vulnerable to various malicious attacks and safety needs to be further improved.
In this paper, we propose a suitable authentication protocol based on smart card and password. The protocol security and performance analysis have been done. Compared to the previous agreements, it is more robust and secure.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses related work. Section 3 presents the proposed authentication protocol. Section 4 analyzes the security and the performance of the proposed protocol. Section 5 finally concludes the paper.
Related Work
User authentication is an important topic for communication security and there are many schemes existed for the purpose. In 1981, Lamport [1] proposed a user authentication scheme based on password for communication in insecure channel. Later, Shimizu Akihiro [2] proposed a dynamic password authentication method using a one-way function. Sandirigama Manjula [3] proposed a simple and secure password authentication protocol in 2000. All above authentication schemes are simple and easy to implement, but the common characteristic is that the verification table is stored on the server. If the attacker steals or modifies the verification table, the system will partly or completely interrupt. In order to overcome this shortcoming, many password authentication scheme based on smart card have been put forward. Ku [6] proposed weaknesses and improvements of an efficient password based remote user authentication scheme using smart cards. Wang [7] analysed and improved two efficient remote user authentication scheme using smart cards. Sood SK [8] proposed an improvement of Xu et al.'s authentication scheme using smart cards. These schemes provide two factor authentication that a successful login requires the user to have a legitimate smart card and a correct password. However, the study found that these mechanisms are vulnerable to various malicious attacks and safety needs to be further improved. Three factor authentication [4] [5] based on smart card add some biological characteristics. However, most people do not like the use of biological recognition factors, and some accidents will lead to the deformation of the hand, eye damage, injury of the vocal cords, the implementation cost is too high. Based on these considerations, the password authentication scheme using smart card is one of the most simple and most convenient authentication method for handling confidential data in insecure network environment.
In this paper, we propose a suitable authentication protocol based on smart card and password which can withstand many kinds of attacks, the protocol security and performance analysis have been done. Compared to the previous agreements, it is more robust and secure.
The Proposed Protocol
In this section, we present our authentication protocol which has five phases: initialization, registration, login, authentication and refreshment of password.
Initialization: The server S selects two large prime numbers p, q, primitive element g of finite field Z p * and calculates n = pq, n is the modulus of the public key and the private key, φ(n) is Euler function and φ(n)=(p-1)(q-1). The server randomly selects a number e which meets gcd(e, φ(n))=1 and computes a number d that satisfy ed≡1(modφ(n)). y=g d mod n, d is the private key of the server, y is the public key. The server secretly saves (d,p,q). The symbol || is the connection operation and ⊕is exclusive-or operation for later use.
Registration: A new user U i selects his identity ID i , password PWD i and a random b, computes P i =h(b⊕PWD i ) and sends (ID i ,P i ) to the server through the secure channel. When receiving the request, the server verify ID i . If ID i has been stored in its database, the server requires the user to give another identity. Otherwise, the user computes 1 ( ) mod
is the private of the server, T R is the user registration time on the server , h(.) is one way hash function. The server establishes an entry (h(ID i ),T R ), encrypts and saves it. The server injects ' mod 
Security and Performance Analysis
In our scheme, the mutual authentication between the user and the server is realized by sending messages (M 1 , T) and (h(US 1 ),r,ID s ,T s ). The user sends a message (M 1 , T) to the server to authenticate the user's identity because no one else can create this valid message. After receiving messages (M 1 , T), the server calculate M 2 and check whether M 1 equals M 2 . If the equation holds, the server considers it as a legitimate communication and achieve the user's authentication. On the other hand, the server sends (h(US 1 ),r,ID s ,T s ) to the user. The message contains US 1 only generated by the server S and any other illegal server cannot generate this information. Once the user receives (h(US 1 ),r,ID s ,T s ), checks if
If it holds, the server is authenticated.
In order to make a forgery attack in our scheme, an attacker needs to forge a login request message (S 2 ,M,C) to pass the authentication. However, the attacker has no way to get S in , b, y and PWD i to calculate S in ' . In addition, the attacker can not find the random number j and ID i to compute S 2 and C. Not knowing the security parameters S in ' and ID i , the attacker can not create authentication messages (M 1 , T). Therefore, the attacker can not create a legitimate login request and can not be disguised as a legitimate user. Our scheme can resist forgery attacks.
Our scheme also can resist replay attack. An attacker can intercept messages(h(US 1 ),r,ID s ,T s ) sent by the server and try to pretend to be a legitimate server for replay attacks. When the user U i began to send (S 2 , M, C), the attacker intercepted the request and sent previous intercepted messages (h(US 1 ),r,ID s ,Ts ' ) to the user. Ts' is the attacker 's current time and date, users can not distinguish replay attack from r, but it can compare if (T-T s ' )≤ ΔT. If it holds, the user computes
. The attacker will not be considered a legitimate server, the attack failed.
Our scheme also achieves anonymity. Assuming an attacker intercepts messages (S 2 ,M,C, h(US 1 ), M 1 ,), the attacker may find user identity ID i from these information. In our proposed scheme, the identity of the user U i is neither stored in the smart card nor transmitted in the network, the attacker can not find ID i . In addition, due to the randomness of the random number j and the difference of login time T R , each calculation information is not same. So the attacker can not get ID i through the message (S 2 ,M,C, h(US 1 ), M 1 ,). At the same time, the attacker do not know the password PWD i , the attacker cannot get the user identity ID i from (S 1 , S in ) in the smart card. Therefore, our proposed scheme can realize the anonymity.
The proposed protocol also can resist parallel session attack, denial of service attack, off-line password guessing attack and stolen verifier attack, server spoofing attack, internal attack and so on which enhance the performance of the protocol.
In order to analyze the performance of the proposed mechanism, we compared the schemes of literature 6-9. The login and authentication stage are more frequently performed in the relevant authentication schemes, so we only consider the cost of these two stages. Compared with literature 6 and literature 7, some computational cost are increased. Compared with the scheme 8 and scheme 9, the computational cost is not increased. However, our scheme satisfies all security requirements [10] , and other schemes do not satisfy this requirement. The security performance comparison with other schemes are as following in Table 1 . 
Conclusions
